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Abstract 
 
In acquisitions, target CEOs face a moral hazard: any personal gain from the deal could be offset by 
the loss of the future compensation stream associated with their jobs. Larger, more important, 
parachutes provide greater relief for these losses. To explicitly measure the moral hazard target CEOs 
face, we standardize the parachute payment by the expected value of their acquisition-induced lost 
compensation. We examine 851 acquisitions from 1999-2007, finding that more important 
parachutes benefit target shareholders through higher completion probabilities. Conversely, as 
parachute importance increases, target shareholders receive lower takeover premia while acquirer 
shareholders capture additional rents from target shareholders. 
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“Companies receiving federal aid are going to have to disclose publicly all the perks and luxuries 
bestowed upon senior executives, and provide an explanation to the taxpayers and to shareholders as 
to why these expenses are justified. And we're putting a stop to these kinds of massive severance 
packages we've all read about with disgust; we're taking the air out of golden parachutes.”   
   
President Barack Obama 
February 4, 20091 
 
I. Introduction 
Golden parachutes are more controversial today than when they first appeared over twenty years 
ago. Advocates argue that parachutes are a necessary part of a competitive pay package required to 
attract and retain talented executives. It is also argued that parachutes are beneficial to shareholders 
since they induce senior managers to “do the right thing” in the event of an acquisition attempt. 
Opponents object to parachutes because they are linked to a change in control of a company, not to 
its continuing or past performance. Detractors portray parachutes as guaranteeing managers “pay-for-
failure,” regardless of shareholder returns. Headlines from the popular press regularly criticize 
golden parachutes and express widespread concern about managerial excess and the lack of pay-for-
performance related to parachute payments. 
Government actions with regard to parachutes mirror the controversy. On January 25, 2011, by a 
3-2 vote, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved an amendment that adds Section 
14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, bowing to pressure from institutional investors and 
other corporate governance activist groups. Under this amendment, companies soliciting votes to 
approve a merger, acquisition, or similar business combination need to disclose golden parachute 
compensation arrangements. The new law also requires these firms to conduct a separate shareholder 
advisory vote to approve golden parachute compensation.2  
                                                     
1 The full speech by president Obama can be viewed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog_post/new_rules/ 
2 The new rules affect Section 14d-10(a)(2) of the 1934 Securities Act which provides a safe harbor enabling the 
compensation committee of a target's board of directors to grant golden parachutes or other benefits to its executives 
during a tender offer negotiation. The SEC approved the safe harbor provision on October 18, 2006. 
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The preceding discussion suggests that the controversy surrounding golden parachutes is alive 
and well. At the heart of the controversy over parachutes is a moral hazard problem: target CEOs 
have direct influence over actions that provide personal benefit or loss at the possible expense of 
their shareholders. To address the moral hazard issue on a modern sample of firms, we study 851 
acquisition offers during 1999-2007 to learn whether parachutes benefit the executives receiving 
them, the shareholders in the firms that grant them, or both. From an academic perspective, these 
issues are similar to classic themes in the literature: incentive alignment and managerial interest.3  
Academic research has greatly enhanced our knowledge of parachutes, but to date, empirical 
analyses have not explicitly modeled the financial tradeoff meeting target CEOs. The moral hazard 
problem is best captured by recognizing the relative takeover related gains and losses experienced by 
the person (arguably) most responsible for the completion and terms of a merger – the target CEO. 
Consequently, we re-examine existing hypotheses on a recent sample of acquisitions using a measure 
of parachute importance that mirrors the moral hazard the target CEO encounters. It scales the 
parachute payment by the expected pay loss this CEO incurs if the merger is completed. 
Our tests reveal that a one standard deviation increase in parachute importance is associated with 
an increase of 6.9 percentage points in deal completion. Our tests also indicate that parachute 
provisions affect the wealth of target CEOs and target shareholders in a non-trivial manner. On 
average, target CEOs cash in about $4.9 million from parachutes when their firms are sold. 
Conversely, a one standard deviation increase in parachute importance is associated with a drop in 
premia of about 2.6 percentage points. This shortfall implies a reduction of $127 million in deal 
value for the average transaction in our sample.  
Given the effect of parachutes on both merger completion probabilities and takeover premia, we 
examine whether it makes sense for target CEOs to accept a lower premium (even with a larger 
                                                     
3 Incentive alignment and managerial interest are hypotheses often studied in settings prone to agency problems; see, 
for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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parachute) because the value of their target-equity-based portfolio (which depends on the takeover 
premium) will decline. Similarly, is it logical for shareholders to provide a parachute to their CEO if 
this benefit might make them worse-off in case of a merger?  
To address rationality concerns related to target shareholders we follow the method in Comment 
and Schwert (1995) and estimate an unconditional premium regression. We find that the 
unconditional premium is a positive function of the presence of a golden parachute. This result 
indicates that including a parachute provision in the CEO’s compensation contract is associated with 
a net gain to shareholders. This finding is significant not only because it shows that it is indeed 
rational for shareholders to provide a parachute to their CEOs but also because it suggests that what 
really matters (during mergers) is the parachute’s relative importance, not just its mere presence. 
In our sample, the unconditional probability of deal completion is 87.8% and the mean takeover 
premium offered is around 35.9%. As noted above, a one standard deviation increase in parachute 
importance raises the probability of merger completion by 6.9 percentage points but lowers the 
takeover premium by 2.6 percentage points. These estimates imply that the expected appreciation 
accruing to the target CEO’s equity-based portfolio is the same (at 31.5%) with or without such 
increase in parachute importance. Given this evidence, the actions of target CEOs that get more 
important parachutes appear perfectly rational. Interestingly, these results also imply that the 
expected premium to target shareholders is essentially the same even with an increase in parachute 
importance. This raises the possibility that target shareholders are not really hurt by more important 
parachutes. In fact, risk averse shareholders might prefer the same expected payoff with less risk 
(higher probability of deal completion).  In a similar fashion, a certainty equivalent argument can 
explain the actions of target CEOs in settling for certain lower premia (and the consequent triggering 
of their merger pay package) rather than bargaining for higher premia at a possible risk to deal 
completion. That is, the negotiated premium represents the target CEO’s own reservation premium 
which provides this executive with a certainty equivalent of his or her lost compensation.  
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We also analyze the investor reactions to the acquisition announcement of the publicly traded 
bidders in our sample. These tests reveal that as the importance of the parachute to target CEOs 
increases, bidding firms earn higher merger announcement returns. This finding indicates that deals 
in which the target CEO gets a relatively more important parachute exhibit a wealth transfer from 
shareholders of the target to shareholders of the buyer. 
We identify a number of empirical issues that could raise concerns related to endogeneity or to 
other econometric biases. First, parachutes are endogenously chosen which introduces the potential 
of self-selection bias. Second, since firms do not randomly become takeover targets, our analyses 
might be vulnerable to sample selection bias. Third, because industry and/or time trends could affect 
the incidence of mergers and the way executive pay is structured, our tests might be prone to an 
omitted variables bias. Fourth, since parachutes are common provisions in many compensation 
contracts, their effect might be anticipated and impounded in a target’s price. Accordingly, our 
analysis could be susceptible to anticipation bias. Fifth, foreknowledge of the premium a potential 
target could command in the event of a takeover might dictate how that firm structures a merger-
related parachute for its CEO. Under this scenario, the direction of causality would be reversed. 
To address the issues described above, we use different empirical specifications and econometric 
methods. Our multivariate tests control for self-selection endogeneity with the Heckman (1979) 
approach. We use the same procedure to address sample selection issues by controlling for the 
probability that a firm becomes a takeover target. Also, to account for anticipation bias, we employ 
the multistage process in Comment and Schwert (1995) and divide parachutes into predictable and 
surprise components. To control for an omitted variables bias, our multivariate tests include year and 
industry fixed effects. To consider reverse causality concerns, we estimate several two-stage 
instrumental variable systems. The inverse association between parachute importance and premia 
remains under the different empirical specifications and econometric techniques we employ. In 
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addition, our results are robust to alternative parachute proxies including a measure of parachute 
importance that scales its value by the value of the merger pay package received by the target CEO. 
Aside from the econometrics issues noted above, it is possible that the results herein obtain 
because the bargaining power of targets offering more important parachutes is low and not because 
their CEOs give away rents. To assuage such concern, we add controls that potentially capture the 
target’s bargaining power. Rhodes-Kropf and Kadyrzhanova (2011) argue that characteristics (such 
as the level of industry concentration) that allow managers to delay takeovers have a significant 
bargaining effect. Consequently, our Heckman (1979) selection equation of the probability of 
becoming a target controls for the Herfindahl index to proxy for the firm’s power in its own industry. 
Additionally, our multivariate tests control for target initiated deals because the results in Aktas, de 
Bodt, and Roll (2010) suggest that this variable is a reasonable proxy for the target’s bargaining 
power. Our regressions also include input-output/sales-purchases (independent) variables between 
the target and the acquirer industries similar to those in Ahern (2012). He argues that these customer-
supplier variables capture the market power of the parties to an acquisition and, therefore, help 
account for the role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers. Our results are robust to 
these different controls for bargaining power. 
Our work provides a better understanding of the wealth effects and incentives of merger-related 
exit pay to target CEOs. This evidence is relevant in the ongoing policy debate regarding best 
practices in corporate governance. Our results are consistent with the following interpretation:  as the 
importance of the parachute to target CEOs increases they negotiate an offer up to their own 
reservation premium which provides them with a certainty equivalent that is proportional to their 
expected lost compensation. At the same time, acquirers experience higher returns which might be a 
manifestation of the lower premium. Therefore, conditional on receiving a bid, (i) target CEOs are 
partially made whole for their personal losses, (ii) target shareholders are worse-off, and (iii) bidder 
shareholders are better-off. This evidence appears consistent with the managerial interest hypothesis 
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of golden parachutes. Nonetheless, this interpretation of our findings ignores the fact that parachutes 
also increase the probability of receiving and completing a bid and thus, increase the welfare of target 
shareholders. Once this factor is considered it is possible that target shareholders are better-off (they 
obtain a completed bid they would not have otherwise received), and bidder shareholders are also 
better-off because they get a good deal conditional on making a bid. Under this interpretation of our 
findings, more important parachutes align the incentives of target shareholders and target CEOs: 
these executives achieve their own interests while still completing advantageous deals for their 
shareholders. 
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, we provide an updated analysis on an 
unresolved topic. To our knowledge, even recent published papers on parachutes [Hartzell, Ofek, and 
Yermack (2004) and Bange and Mazzeo (2004)] use samples ending in 1997 and 1990, respectively. 
Because the last ten to fifteen years have arguably witnessed the most dramatic changes in corporate 
governance in history, analyzing parachutes in the current decade is important.4 As the President’s 
recent comments indicate, golden parachutes remain a controversial tool of corporate governance.  
Second, we develop a new measure of the importance of parachutes. It reflects the moral hazard 
issue faced by target CEOs, generally the single most important executive in merger negotiations. 
Our measure, which scales the parachute payment by the expected pay loss this CEO incurs if the 
merger is completed, is unlike those in the extant literature. Indeed, existing studies in this literature 
either control for the presence of a parachute or assess the increased acquisition costs related to the 
parachute. However, none measures the importance of the parachute to the target CEO.5 We show 
that the certainty equivalent of the lost compensation to target CEOs is proportional to the expected 
                                                     
4 Cheffins (2009) chronicles numerous governance regulatory changes occurring in the U.S. during 1990-2007.  
5 Among published papers in the literature studying parachutes, Knoeber (1986), Denis and Serrano (1996), Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Evans, Noe, and Thornton Jr (1997), Agrawal and Knoeber  (1998), Hartzell, Ofek, 
and Yermack  (2004), and Bange and Mazzeo (2004) use dummy variables to capture the presence of a parachute. 
Others studies like Lambert and Larcker (1985), Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993), and Lefanowicz, Robinson, and 
Smith (2000) divide the value of the parachute by the target’s market value of equity. 
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value of that compensation. This result indicates that our measure of parachute importance is unique 
in that it captures the incentives CEOs face when their firms become acquisition targets. 
Third, existing studies focus on the impact parachutes have on the performance of the firms 
granting these benefits. We advance this literature by also examining the potential effect of the 
parachute given to the target CEO on the return to shareholders in the acquiring firm.  
Fourth, our empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction in Ross (2004) that the overall 
structure of a pay schedule (even one markedly convex) could result in more (instead of less) risk-
aversion. Ross argues that attitudes towards risk depend not only on the convexity of an agent’s 
compensation schedule, but also on how the overall schedule maps into more (or less) risk averse 
regions of the agent’s utility function to the extent it can undo the impact of convex (or concave) pay 
schedules. Our findings suggest that the relative importance of the parachute curtails the convexity 
that equity-based pay imposes upon the target CEO’s utility function. Importantly, under this 
interpretation, our results offer a plausible answer to a paradox in the literature showing that target 
CEOs often accept lower premia in exchange for benefits [like unscheduled option grants (Fich, Cai, 
and Tran, 2011), augmented parachutes or bonuses (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004), or jobs in 
the merged firm (Wulf, 2004)] that are unlikely to fully cover their merger-related personal losses. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our data. Section III contains our empirical 
analyses. Section IV addresses a number of robustness issues. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Data and Sample Characteristics 
We begin with a base sample of 4,381 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announced during 1999-
2007 and tracked in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) M&A database. We require the target to 
be a publicly traded U.S. firm and exclude spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, 
self-tenders, privatizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and 
transactions in which deal value is less than $1 million. From this group, we keep 3,521 deals in 
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which targets have stock return and accounting data available from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We lose 278 deals because premium data are 
missing from SDC and from other sources such as CRSP, LexisNexis, or Factiva. After filtering out 
deals in which governance data for targets are not available from RiskMetrics, our final sample 
consists of 851 offers. 
A. Target and Deal Characteristics 
We read the S-4, DEFM14A, SC-TO, and DEF14A proxies filed with the SEC by the target 
and/or acquiring firm. From these proxies we obtain information on the sale procedure, the party that 
initiates the deal, and the date merger negotiations begin. Panel A of Table 1 reports the offer 
characteristics in our sample. Among the 851 transactions, about 18% are tender offers and 7% are 
hostile takeovers. These statistics compare favorably to those in Officer (2003). His sample of 
acquisitions during 1988-2000 consists of about 20% tender offers and 8% hostile deals. Similar to 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), almost 55% of the transactions in our sample are paid in 
cash. The deals we study have a completion rate close to 88%, which is comparable to that in Officer 
(2003) who reports a completion rate of 83%. We follow the procedure in Boone and Mulherin 
(2007) to identify the start of merger negotiations and the party responsible for initiating the deal. We 
find that in over 39% of all deals the target firm initiates the sale. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) 
find that in about 42% of the cases they study target firms initiate the merger. Grinstein and Hribar 
(2004) report a mean deal value of $4.7 billion for the transactions they examine which is similar to 
the $4.76 billion mean value in our sample. 
Panel B of Table 1 contains key financial characteristics for the target firms in our sample. The 
average (median) market value of equity is $3.302 billion ($0.991 billion) and leverage accounts for 
26% (25%) of total assets. These statistics are comparable to those of Boone and Mulherin (2007) 
who report a mean market capitalization of $2.7 billion and Bates and Lemmon (2003) who report an 
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average leverage of 23.3%. Targets in our sample have a median market-to-book ratio of 1.42, which 
is close to the median ratio of 1.69 reported by Officer (2003) for the same variable.  
B. Target CEO Characteristics 
In Panel C of Table 1, we report the target CEO’s characteristics. On average, 57% of all CEOs 
also chair their boards and almost 13% are their firm’s founders. The average (median) CEO is 54 
(55) years old, owns 4.6% (1.8%) of the firm’s common equity, and has been the chief executive for 
about 7 (5) years. These characteristics concur with those in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) 
who report the following CEO statistics: mean age of 54, average equity ownership of 3.6%, and 
median tenure of 5 years. 
We collect compensation data from proxy statements filed by each target with the SEC. In some 
instances, we supplement these data with information in the Execucomp database. Key compensation 
characteristics for target CEOs in our sample appear in Panel D of Table 1. Bebchuk and Grinstein 
(2005) report an average of $5.01 million in total CEO compensation.6 During the last year in office 
prior to the deal, the average CEO in our sample earns about $5.4 million in annual total pay. 
C. Lost Compensation 
CEOs that sell their firms forfeit the compensation they would earn if they were to remain in 
office. We follow the methodology and assumptions in Yermack (2004) and in Fich, Cai, and Tran 
(2011) to calculate the expected lost pay for the target CEOs in our sample. First, we use information 
on their current compensation, their restricted stock, and their option holdings as reported in proxy 
statements before the merger announcement. Second, we assume that all CEOs retire by age 65 and 
that CEOs who are at least 65 years old expect to stay in office one more year before retiring. Third, 
we assume that the probability of departure increases by 4% each year due to acquisitions, delistings, 
or other turnover reasons. Fourth, we assume that salary and bonus increase by 2% from that 
                                                     
6 Specifically, they report an average total compensation of $9.41 million for CEOs of S&P500 firms, $3.94 million 
for CEOs of MidCap400 firms and $2.05 million for CEOs of SmallCap600 firms during 1993-2003. 
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received during the year prior to the acquisition when firm performance is above the Fama and 
French (1997) median industry ROA. Fifth, we assume that the probability of departure increases by 
an additional 2% if the company performs below the industry median. Finally, we use a real rate of 
3% to discount cash flows. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) estimate that the present value of lost income 
for CEOs expected to remain in office for another seven years is $45.5 million. On average, the 
present value of the expected lost pay for target CEOs in our sample is close to $40 million. Given 
our estimates, it appears that employment termination due to a takeover triggers non-trivial wealth 
losses for target CEOs.  
D. Parachute Provisions for Target CEOs 
Many boards of directors provide parachutes to their CEOs. We obtain information on these 
provisions from the last proxy filed by the targets prior to the merger announcement, the S-4 proxy 
filed by the acquirers, and/or the DEFM14A proxy filed by the targets following the merger 
announcement. Among the 851 targets, 735 (or about 86%) have a golden parachute in place for their 
CEOs before merger negotiations begin. From the target CEO’s employment agreement, we are able 
to estimate the size of the parachute. Specifically, when a parachute is provided, the employment 
agreement often stipulates that the parachute payment is based on a multiple of the executive’s 
regular cash compensation. Panel D of Table 1 shows that the mean (median) parachute payment is 
$4.87 million ($2.55 million).7  
Section 280G of the Internal Revenue Code states that: “if the present value of a change-in-
control payment (golden parachute) exceeds the safe harbor (three times the average taxable 
compensation over the five most recent calendar years preceding the change-in-control, less $1), the 
company loses tax deductions for these excess amounts. Additionally, the executive is required to 
                                                     
7 It is important to emphasize that parachute payments might be subject to either a “single trigger” or a “double 
trigger” provision. Under a single trigger, the CEO obtains the parachute payment because a change-in-control 
occurs or because he or she is terminated without cause. Under a “double trigger” the CEO receives payment if he or 
she is terminated without cause or quits for good reason after the change in control. Our results continue to hold 
when we control for whether a single or double trigger is necessary to obtain the parachute payment. 
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pay a 20% excise tax on the excess payment.” Given this tax rule, it would be reasonable to assume 
that most firms would set the multiple used to value a golden parachute to three. Consistent with this 
assumption, the information in Panel D of Table 1 indicates that at least 75% of our target firms use a 
multiple of 3 or lower to value a parachute. Nonetheless, in our sample, the highest parachute 
valuation multiple equals 5.25. 
E. Temporal and Industrial Distribution of Parachute Importance 
As noted earlier, we measure the relative importance of golden parachutes to target CEOs by 
dividing the value of the parachute by the compensation these executives expect to forego when their 
firms are acquired. In Panel A and Panel B of Table 2, we show the distribution of parachute 
importance in our sample over time and across industries, respectively. Our parachute importance 
measure appears generally stable over time, albeit slightly larger in 2002.  
The information in Panel A of Table 2 also shows that the annual number of mergers is higher at 
the beginning and at the end of our sample period, which coincides with periods of economic 
expansion when the stock market valuation is higher. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2004) show that stock market health drives merger activity. The temporal 
distribution of our sample appears in line with the merger activity reported in these studies.  
The industrial distribution of our sample (reported in Panel B of Table 2) is also similar to that 
reported in the existing M&A literature and to the actual distribution in the base sample from SDC. 
For example, Officer (2003) reports that 2% of his sample are firms in durable consumer goods, 
17.4% in business equipment, 7.8% in shops, and 4.6% in chemicals. The percentage of targets in our 
sample that belong to those same industries is quite similar: 2.7%, 20.1%, 10%, and 2.1%, 
respectively. In addition, the base acquisition sample from SDC has 22.6% of targets in business 
equipment, 3.8% in telecommunications, and 8.9% in the healthcare industry. Analogously, the 
incidence in our final sample is 20.1%, 4%, and 8.9% for those same industries, respectively.  
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III. Empirical Analyses 
A. Determinants of Parachute Importance 
In Table 3, we run three Tobit models to study the importance of parachutes for target CEOs. We 
run Tobit models because the dependent variable (the ratio of the parachute’s size to the present 
value of lost pay to the CEO) is left-hand censored. The regressions control for target firm, target 
CEO, and target firm governance characteristics that could affect the relative importance of 
parachutes; these are defined in the legend accompanying Table 3. All models include year and 
industry fixed effects. 
Our results indicate that the relative importance of parachutes for target CEOs decreases in larger 
firms. In addition, the marginal effect implied by our estimates indicates that the importance of 
parachutes decreases by 14.3 percentage points when the target CEO is also the firm’s founder. Other 
estimates imply that parachute importance increases by about 0.9 percentage points with a one 
standard deviation increase in the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) G index: firms with greater 
takeover defenses are more likely to give their CEOs greater parachutes in case of a merger. In 
addition, according to model (3) in Table 3, parachute importance increases for target CEOs aged 62 
or older. 
B. Parachute Importance and Merger Completion 
Golden parachutes might be a symptom of managerial entrenchment. In fact, the presence of a 
parachute is one of the 24 anti-takeover provisions tracked by the RiskMetrics and indexed by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Given this, golden parachutes may increase a firm’s ability to 
defeat a takeover attempt (Malatesta and Walkling, 1988). Nonetheless, the empirical evidence 
related to the parachutes’ effect on takeover probability is mixed.8  
                                                     
8 For instance, whereas Cotter and Zenner (1994) do not find an association between parachutes and the likelihood 
of a successful takeover, Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010) do. 
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In Table 4, we examine the relation between parachute importance and deal completion. One 
presumes that completed deals are beneficial to target shareholders since premia are generally paid 
and in the case of mergers and tender offers the target shareholders have the option of not approving 
the deal. Hence, in Table 4, we report the estimation of two variants of a fixed effects logit model in 
which the dependent variable equals “1” for completed deals and “0” for withdrawn deals. Officer 
(2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) estimate similar models. Therefore, the control variables in 
our regressions are similar to theirs. The exception, of course, is our proxy of parachute importance.  
The tests in Table 4 also include control variables to proxy for the potential bargaining power of 
the parties to the deal. We add a dummy for target initiated deals. Following Ahern (2012), we also 
include input-output/sales-purchases variables (for the target and acquirer industries). Ahern notes 
that these variables control for the effect of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers. 
Because golden parachutes are endogenously determined, in model (1) of Table 4 we control for 
endogenous self-selection by using the Heckman (1979) inverse Mill’s ratio (λ1). Moreover, since 
firms do not randomly become takeover targets, in model (2) we control for sample selection by 
using a different inverse Mill’s ratio (λ2) based on a regression of the probability of becoming an 
acquisition target.9 
Results for the control variables in Table 4 are consistent with those in the existing M&A 
literature. Transactions are about 9.5 percentage points more likely to materialize if there is a target 
termination fee. This marginal effect is comparable to that of 11 percentage points in Officer (2003). 
Tender offers are 4.2 percentage points more likely to go through, as are mergers in which the parties 
to the transaction are in the same industry. As in Bates and Lemmon (2003), deals are less likely to 
be completed if there is prior bidding or if the deal is hostile. 
                                                     
9 The Parachute Heckman self-selection and the target Heckman self-selection involve a first-stage estimation of the 
probability of having a golden parachute and the probability of being a target, respectively. We report these first-
stage models, both of which are estimated in a sample of 14,157 firm-years, in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix. 
In the second stage, the inverse Mill's ratio derived from the first stage model is included in the estimation as a 
variable to control for endogenous self-selection.  
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Of primary interest is the result that deal completion increases with the importance of the 
parachute. The marginal effect implied by the estimates in Table 4 indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in parachute importance raises the probability of deal completion by 6.9 
percentage points. This finding could be consistent with the incentive alignment hypothesis in that 
larger parachutes motivate target CEOs to complete the deal. Target CEOs care about deal 
completion because they can cash in their parachutes and their equity-based portfolio in full since all 
restrictions and vesting periods disappear when the target firm ceases to exist as a standalone firm. 
C. Parachute Importance and Acquisition Premia 
Payments under parachute provisions can strengthen a target’s bargaining position with the 
bidding firm (Comment and Schwert, 1995). However, studies examining the association between 
parachutes and the premia paid for target firms provide mixed evidence. For example, Cotter and 
Zenner (1994), Bange and Mazzeo (2004), and Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) find no 
association while Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010) report an inverse association. Hartzell, Ofek, 
and Yermack (2004) examine situations in which the value of the parachute to the target CEO is 
augmented prior to deal completion. They show that such augmentations are not associated with the 
premium paid for the target company. None of these studies, however, defines the parachute in terms 
specifically related to the moral hazard dilemma the target CEO confronts: the gain from the 
parachute relative to the expected loss of future pay to this executive if the deal is completed.  
We use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable in a set of eight 
regressions similar to those in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008).10 These premium 
regressions are reported in Table 5. The independent variables of interest are four different proxies 
based on the golden parachute payment to the target CEO. These variables are: in model (1), the 
value of the parachute divided by the present value of the expected lost pay to the target CEO; in 
model (2), a dummy variable set to “1” if the CEO’s compensation contract includes a parachute 
                                                     
10 Following Officer (2003) we restrict this premium measure to 2 (or 200%) to avoid extreme outliers. 
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provision; in model (3), the natural logarithm of the payments we identify as parachute 
compensation; and in model (4), the multiple used to calculate the value of the parachute. Although 
the first proxy is designed to measure the relative impact of the parachute on the target CEO’s wealth 
in particular, the remaining proxies also measure the importance of the parachute in general. For each 
proxy, we estimate the premium regression model twice: once controlling for self-selection and then 
controlling for sample selection. All other independent variables are defined in the legend 
accompanying Table 5. 
The estimates in models (1A) and (1B) of Table 5 indicate that a one standard deviation increase 
in parachute importance is associated with a decrease in premia of 2.6 percentage points. This drop in 
premia translates to an average decline of $127 million in terms of deal value.  
The coefficients related to the other parachute proxies in models (2), (3), and (4) are also 
negative and significant. The estimates in model (2) indicate that when the parachute has zero 
importance to the target CEO takeover premia increase by 6.2 percentage points. The estimates in 
model (3) imply a drop in premia of 4.8 percentage points for a $1 million dollar increase in the 
value of the parachute. According to model (4), targets experience a 1.8 percentage point decline in 
premia for a one unit increase in the parachute multiple. Consequently, the estimates related to the 
proxies in models (2), (3), and (4) also document an inverse association between parachute 
importance and takeover premia. However, the interpretation that arises from these proxies is not as 
economically informative as that arising from model (1). This occurs because it is possible that 
parachutes of the same value (or those calculated with the same multiple) deliver very different 
incentives. Therefore, by standardizing the value of the parachute by the pay target CEOs expect to 
give up, we are able to more accurately assess the incentives of parachutes during acquisitions. 
The estimates for other independent variables in Table 5 are consistent with the existing M&A 
literature. We also find that acquisition premia increase with recent excess returns, liquidity, and in 
deals structured as tender offers. Bid premia also increase with rumors, prior bidding, and the 
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existence of a target termination fee. As in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) and Bargeron, 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010), we do not find an association between the premia paid and 
whether the target CEO gets a job in the merged firm.  
Notably, bargaining power affects the gains to target shareholders in mergers: bid premia are 
around 5% lower in deals initiated by the target firm. This result agrees with those in Fich, Cai, and 
Tran (2011). They also document an inverse association between premia and target initiated deals. In 
addition, bid premia decrease in the size of the target company, in deals by private acquirers, and in 
situations when the CEOs near retirement age. This last result is consistent with the findings in Jenter 
and Lewellen (2011). They show that premia are eight to ten percentage points lower when the target 
firm has a retirement-age CEO. 
D. Rationality Considerations 
Several papers in the M&A literature document (but do not explicitly recognize) a potential 
paradox. Specifically, studies find that target CEOs often accept lower premia when they obtain a 
benefit that is unlikely to totally make up for their takeover-related personal losses. For example, 
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) show that when target CEOs get extraordinary personal 
treatment (such as a parachute augmentation or a merger bonus), target shareholders receive a lower 
premium. Likewise, Wulf (2004) reports that target CEOs trade takeover premia for a powerful job in 
the merged firm. Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) document a similar result when the benefit involves 
unscheduled stock option grants approved during non-public merger negotiations. 
Our results on golden parachutes suggest a similar paradox for both the target CEOs and their 
shareholders. From the target CEOs’ perspective, a decrease in the takeover premium will create a 
private loss for these CEOs (due to a drop in the value of their equity-based portfolio) which their 
parachutes might not fully cover.11 This raises a question: why would target CEOs with parachutes 
                                                     
11 The equity-based portfolio contains the target CEOs’ (and their immediate family’s) share-ownership in the firm, 
stock options, and restricted stock. 
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consent to a lower premium if doing so possibly makes them worse-off? From the target 
shareholders’ perspective, a similar question emerges: why would they include a golden parachute 
provision in their CEO’s pay contract if this benefit makes them worse-off at the time of an 
acquisition bid? 
D.1. Target CEOs 
For the transactions we study, the unconditional probability that an acquisition is completed is 
approximately 87.8% and the average takeover premium offered is about 35.9%. Ceteris paribus, in 
this base case, the appreciation of the target CEO’s equity-based portfolio is a function of an 
expected takeover premium of approximately 31.51%. Nonetheless, our results indicate that a single 
standard deviation increase in parachute importance raises the probability of deal completion by 
about 6.9 percentage points but lowers the premium by around 2.6 percentage points. Under these 
circumstances, we estimate the expected takeover premium to be approximately 31.52%. 
Consequently, it appears that the expected appreciation of the target CEO’s equity-based portfolio is 
about the same in the base case and in the presence of a more important parachute. A certainty 
equivalent argument can also explain the actions of target CEOs.  Rather than bargain hard for higher 
premia and risk not completing the deal, target CEOs settle for smaller, but certain premia which 
insure deal success and, at the same time, partially make these CEOs whole for their expected 
personal losses.12 Put differently, by increasing the target CEO's total merger payout relative to the 
expected value of his or her lost compensation, the parachute gets the CEO up to or past the certainty 
equivalent of that expected lost compensation.  
Hence, the behavior we document for these target CEOs appears rational because their actions 
reveal that they are (i) utility maximizing agents (that get more satisfaction from current consumption 
                                                     
12 In fact, target CEOs are probably better-off in the latter case. They get a relatively larger parachute and (if the deal 
is completed) they can cash in their equity-based portfolio in full since all stock restrictions and option vesting 
periods are lifted when the target ceases to exist as a standalone firm. 
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than from deferred consumption), and (ii) risk averse agents (that always prefer the same excepted 
payoff with less risk).13 
Under a similar logic, target shareholders might not be at a disadvantage when their CEO gets a 
more important parachute because they get essentially the same expected premium with or without an 
increase in the importance of the parachute. In fact, target shareholders are probably better-off when 
their CEO gets a more important parachute because under these circumstances they get a completed 
bid they would not otherwise have received. 
We note that the finding that target CEOs settle for a lower premium (even CEOs with an equity-
based portfolio that includes option grants and other stock pay) conforms to the theories in Ross 
(2004). He argues that attitudes towards risk depend not only on the convexity of an agent’s 
compensation schedule, but also on how the overall schedule maps into more (or less) risk averse 
areas of the agent’s utility function. Ross states that the mapping of the overall compensation 
schedule can undo the impact of convex (or concave) pay schedules. Our findings suggest that 
raising the importance of the parachute mitigates the convexity that equity-based pay imposes in the 
target CEO’s utility function which, in turn, makes the target CEO more risk averse. 
D.2. Target Shareholders 
Using the method in Comment and Schwert (1995), we estimate an unconditional premium 
regression in a sample of 14,157 firm-years with data available from CRSP, Compustat, and 
RiskMetrics during 1999-2007. In this regression, which is reported as model (1) in Table 6, the key 
independent variable is a parachute (0,1) indicator. As in Comment and Schwert, we set the premium 
to zero in nontakeover firm-years. The estimates in model (1) of Table 6 show that the presence of a 
parachute is a positive and statistically significant function of the unconditional premium. This result 
                                                     
13 Our results indicate that by acquiescing to a lower premium, target CEOs potentially give up substantial value 
related to their stock and option holdings. This finding is consistent with those in Huddart and Lang (1996). They 
show that top managers tend to exercise options long before expiration (often around vesting dates and following 
price run-ups), sacrificing, on average, 50% of their Black-Scholes value. 
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indicates that a parachute is associated to an unconditional net gain to shareholders.14 Consequently, 
this evidence suggests that providing their CEOs with a parachute appears to be a perfectly rational 
choice for target shareholders.15 Moreover, when the parachute provision is first put in place, it is 
unlikely that shareholders know (i) whether (or when) their firm will become an acquisition target or 
(ii) how relatively important (to the CEO) the parachute will turn out to be in case of a merger. This 
lack of foreknowledge also rationalizes the shareholders’ choice with regards to including a 
parachute provision in their CEO’s compensation contract.   
E. Anticipation Bias 
It is no surprise to the market that many firms offer parachutes to their CEOs. Moreover, Jensen 
and Zimmerman (1985) argue that stock prices might reflect the anticipation of a takeover premium 
if a golden parachute reveals that a takeover is more likely. To recognize this, we follow the 
methodology of Comment and Schwert (1995) and replace the (0,1) indicator for the presence of a 
parachute with variables related to the anticipated and surprise components of the parachute. These 
components are estimates from the parachute prediction regression reported as model (2) of Table 
A1. We estimate this prediction regression in a sample of 14,157 firm-years with data available from 
CRSP, Compustat, and RiskMetrics during 1999-2007. The predictable component is an estimate of 
the probability that the target CEO’s compensation contract includes a parachute provision. The 
surprise component is computed as the parachute indicator minus the estimated probability that the 
target CEO has a parachute. 
In models (2) and (3) of Table 6 we present two regressions of the conditional takeover premium 
in which the parachute components are the independent variables of interest. For reference and in the 
                                                     
14 Our interpretation is based on Comment and Schwert’s (1995, p.30) assertion that “The estimated effect of 
antitakeover measures on the unconditional premium is of interest because it is a net effect of a decrease in the 
premium if antitakeover devices deter offers and an increase if they increase premiums in successful takeovers.” 
15 In addition, existing academic work provides additional rationales for the shareholder’s approval of a parachute 
for their CEO, particularly when the firm is not a takeover target. For example, it is argued that parachutes (i) 
encourage managerial human capital investment in the firm (i.e.: Knoeber, 1986 and Berkovitch and Khanna, 1991), 
(ii) prompt top managers to eliminate redundant or inefficient operations (i.e.: Lambrecht and Myers, 2007), and (iii) 
promote innovation (Francis, Hasan, and Sharma, 2009 and Manso, 2010). 
 20
spirit of Comment and Schwert (1995), in both tests we include the estimate for the parachute 
dummy from separate similarly structured premium regressions that do not include the golden 
parachute components. 
The coefficient on the surprise parachute variable in models (2) and (3) of Table 6 is negative and 
significant, indicating that the unanticipated effect of a golden parachute is associated with lower bid 
premia. In contrast, the predictable parachute component does not attain statistical significance. 
Therefore, the most we can conclude is that the known existence of golden parachutes is already 
impounded in a target’s value. Nonetheless, this conclusion is important because it validates the view 
that it is not the mere presence of a parachute, but its relative importance to the target CEO, that 
matters. Consequently, it is plausible that the unanticipated negative effect captured by the surprise 
parachute variable in the conditional premium tests reflects the amount by which parachutes wind up 
insulating target CEOs from personal losses.  
F. Parachute Importance and Acquirer Returns  
 The foregoing results indicate that as the level of parachute importance increases, the premia paid 
to target firms decrease and the probability of deal completion increases. Because of this trade-off, 
our tests show that target shareholders get the same expected premium despite an increase in the 
importance of the parachute to their CEO. Since the premium paid for targets and the probability of 
deal success may also affect the bidder, we now evaluate whether the importance of parachutes to 
target CEOs affects the acquirer shareholders’ wealth. 
 To test whether (and how) the importance of parachutes to target CEOs affects the returns to 
acquirers, in Table 7, we run two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the three-day merger 
announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) meeting the 459 publicly traded bidders in our 
sample. We follow the M&A literature in order to properly specify our acquirer return regressions. 
For instance, both models in Table 7 control for deal, market, and bidder characteristics similar to 
those in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). Model (2) of 
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Table 7 includes target characteristics similar to those in Moeller (2005) and Wang and Xie (2009) as 
additional controls.16 The independent variable of interest in Table 7 is our proxy of parachute 
importance: the value of the golden parachute scaled by the expected pay compensation to the target 
CEO.   
 The estimates in Table 7 indicate that acquirer returns increase as the level of parachute 
importance to the target CEO increases. A one standard deviation increase in parachute importance is 
associated with an increase in bidder returns of 0.7%. This increase translates into a gain of $205 
million in terms of market capitalization for the average bidder in our sample. This finding conflicts 
with the notion that target shareholders are not worse-off when their CEO gets a more important 
parachute because they get essentially the same expected premium. Instead, our bidder returns tests 
document a transfer of rents from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders when target CEOs 
have more important parachutes. Our previous results indicate that it is rational for target 
shareholders to implement a golden parachute.  But as we have also noted, it is impossible for future 
targets to precisely anticipate the timing of the bid or the relative importance of golden parachutes to 
the CEO.  An unintended consequence is that parachutes that turn out to be overly generous can 
cause target CEOs to become more risk averse and (perhaps needlessly) surrender rents to the 
bidding firm. At the same time, the fact that acquirer returns are higher is another manifestation of 
the lower bid premium (the other is the higher probability of completing the deal). As a result, the 
evidence that acquirer shareholders are better-off when more important parachutes are provided to 
the target CEOs is not inconsistent with the finding that target shareholders also benefit because they 
get a completed bid they would not have otherwise received. 
 
                                                     
16 The control variables in Table 7 yield results similar to those in other papers. As in Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2005), bidder size is negatively related to the acquirer return. Like Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), the 
competitive industry indicator yields positive coefficients while the bidder G index and the relative size variable 
yield negative coefficients. 
 22
IV. Additional Tests 
 In this section, we describe alternative tests we conduct in order to assess the robustness of the 
preceding results. 
A. Reverse Causality 
A key test of the incentive alignment vs. managerial interest hypotheses is the relation of the 
parachute to the premium paid in the acquisition. The analyses in Table 5 document an inverse 
association between parachute importance and takeover premia. However, companies expecting a 
low premium if they become takeover targets might provide a more generous (and important) 
parachute to their CEOs. Under this possibility, the direction of causality would be reversed. 
To address whether the endogenous choice between parachute importance and deal premia 
affects the results presented in Table 5, we estimate four different systems of simultaneous equations 
following the methodology in Maddala (1983). Each system uses a different golden parachute proxy. 
In all systems, bid premia and the individual parachute proxy are provided as the two endogenous 
variables. For every system, the parachute variable and bid premia instruments are separately 
estimated from first-stage regressions. The second-stage tests consist of an OLS regression of bid 
premia on the parachute instrument and a regression of the parachute proxy on the instrument for the 
bid premia, respectively. The standard errors in these tests are adjusted for the fact that the 
instrumental variables for the parachute and bid premia are estimated.  
To identify the simultaneous system, we must exclude one exogenous variable from each of the 
two second-stage regression equations. For the parachute equation, we must satisfy the relevancy 
condition with a variable that is correlated with the parachute after controlling for all other 
exogenous variables. The same variable will satisfy the exclusion restriction if it is uncorrelated with 
the error term of the second-stage premium regression. For this variable we use the CEO founder 
(0,1) dummy. Table 3 indicates that this variable is significantly related to our parachute proxy. Prior 
research by Moeller (2005) and the estimates in Table 5 show that the founder (0,1) dummy is 
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unrelated to premia. For the premium equation, we use the target’s excess stock return during the 
year prior to the acquisition. This variable appears to satisfy the relevancy condition and the 
exclusion restriction. A recent study by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010), as well as the results in 
Table 5, shows that a target’s prior excess return is related to the bid premium. The evidence in both 
Table 3 and Table A1 indicates that the excess return variable is not related to the parachute. 
Table 8 presents our simultaneous equations analyses. In Panel A of Table 8 we use the 
importance of the parachute relative to the lost compensation as our proxy for the parachute. After 
accounting for endogeneity, the parachute instrument in the second-stage premium regression is 
negative and statistically significant. In contrast, the premium instrument in the second-stage 
parachute regression is not different from zero. This last result indicates that bid premia are unrelated 
to parachute importance and provides no evidence of causation running in the reverse direction. The 
interpretation that arises from our second stage premium regression is similar to those in Table 5. 
According to our estimates, a 10 percentage point increase in parachute importance with respect to 
the expected lost compensation is associated with a reduction in premia of about 3 percentage points.  
In Panel B of Table 8 we use the other three parachute proxies described earlier. For each of 
these proxies, we also estimate a simultaneous system consisting of two first-stage and two second-
stage regressions. To conserve space, we only report the two second-stage regressions for each 
system. The tests in Panel B of Table 8 also document an inverse and significant association between 
the parachute instrument and bid premia. However, the same tests reveal no association between the 
premium instrument and the golden parachute dependent variables. Overall, the results of our 
simultaneous equations analyses lend no support to the conjecture that causality runs in the reverse 
direction. 17 
                                                     
17 We note that the simultaneous system in which we use the parachute indicator (0,1) only reveals that there is no 
reverse causality. The economic effect of the parachute is not readily interpretable from the second stage premium 
regression that uses this indicator as the parachute proxy (Maddala, 1983). 
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B. Alternative Scaling of the Parachute Payment 
In the preceding tests, we assess the relative importance of parachutes by scaling their value by 
the expected lost compensation to target CEOs if the deal is completed. There are least two issues of 
potential concern with this measure of parachute importance. First, as noted in Section II.C, we use 
current pay as the main input to estimate the lost compensation to the target CEO upon an 
acquisition. While our tests control for immediate past performance, the literature shows that current 
pay is typically a function of multiple years of performance.18 Consequently, if pay reacts with a lag 
to cumulated poor performance, the current pay used in the lost compensation calculation could be 
high. This issue could be relevant because we use excess returns for the identification in the 
simultaneous systems tests. While excess returns may not be related to the existence of the parachute, 
they may be related to its importance through the compensation effect described above. Second, we 
note that to fully understand the incentives of the target CEOs, we would need to consider how the 
change in value in their existing firm-specific equity-based portfolios (plus accelerated vesting, etc.) 
affects their expected wealth loss due to a merger. However, neither our measure of parachute 
importance nor the other proxies we use in our earlier tests consider the magnitude of the target 
CEOs’ equity-based payoff.  
To address the issues just noted, we scale the parachute payment by a totally different measure: 
the value of the total merger pay-package to the target CEO.19 This proxy, which considers the target 
CEO’s equity-based payoff, tracks the importance of the parachute relative to the entire acquisition-
related compensation the executive gets. 
In Table 9, we replicate earlier tests using the alternative proxy of parachute importance. 
Specifically, Panel A in Table 9 presents premium regressions similar to those reported in Table 5. 
                                                     
18 See, for example, Boschen and Smith (1995). 
19 As in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), this package includes common equity and stock option appreciation, 
the parachute, and, in some cases, a special merger bonus. The average merger pay package drawn by target CEOs 
in our sample is worth almost $36 million. 
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These tests document an inverse and statistically significant association between parachute 
importance (relative to the merger pay package) and premia. Based on the coefficient estimates, a 5 
percentage point increase in parachute importance is associated with a decline in premia of 2.2 
percentage points. This decline is economically meaningful: for the average sample target the lower 
premia imply a shortfall of about $108 million in terms of deal value.20  
Panel B in Table 9 presents simultaneous regression analyses similar to those in Panel B of Table 
8. Consistent with our earlier tests, whereas the premium instrument is not statistically significant in 
the parachute regression, the parachute instrument is negative and significant in the premium 
regression. In addition, in untabulated tests we find that a one standard deviation increase in the 
alternative measure of parachute importance increases (i) the probability of merger completion by 8.5 
percentage points and (ii) the return to the acquirer firms by 0.34%. Overall, the analyses on the 
importance of the parachute relative to the merger pay-package generate inferences similar to those 
obtained using our other proxy of parachute importance.  
C. Takeover Premia Alternatives  
The estimates presented in Tables 5, 6, 8, and 9 are based on the four-week premium reported by 
SDC. We re-estimate all target premia using (i) the combined method in Officer (2003), (ii) the CAR 
running from 20 days before the deal announcement (AD-20) until the day after (AD+1) following 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and, (iii) the cumulated returns over the (-42, +126) window as in Schwert 
(1996). Our results continue to hold when we use these alternative premium measures. For example, 
using the combined premium (Officer, 2003), we estimate that a one standard deviation increase in 
                                                     
20 We are sensitive that the results that obtain when we scale the parachute by the merger pay package are driven by 
the fact that the offer price is used to value the equity components of the merger pay package. To address this issue 
and purge the offer price from the merger pay package, we record each target’s stock price six weeks prior to the 
start of merger negotiations. We use this price and the Black-Scholes methodology to value all the stock options 
held by the target CEO. Similarly, we use this price to value all stock and restricted stock owned by the target CEO. 
With these new values, we re-estimate the dollar amount of the merger pay package six weeks prior to the start of 
merger negotiations. Finally, we standardize the parachute by this alternative estimate of the merger pay package. 
This ratio becomes the key independent variable in regressions similar to those in Table 9. The results from these 
tests produce inferences similar to those in the main text: higher parachute importance is related to lower premia. 
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parachute importance (relative to the target CEO’s expected lost pay) is related to a target premium 
that is 3.1 percentage points lower. This shortfall triggers a decline of about $152 million in deal 
value for the average sample target. This result is similar to those tabulated. 21  
D. Clustering 
 The industrial distribution of our sample, which we report in Panel B of Table 2, exhibits some 
clustering in Business Equipment. We re-estimate all of the premium regressions in Tables 5 and 9 
clustering the standard errors by the target’s 2-digit SIC and also by their Fama and French (1997) 48 
industry groups. The target premium results related to all of our parachute proxies are robust to 
clustering the standard errors by the targets’ industrial classification. 
E. Selection Issues 
The deal completion tests in Table 4 and the target premia regressions in Tables 5 and 9 use the 
methodology in Heckman (1979) to control for self-selection (because firms can choose to offer a 
parachute) and for sample selection (since companies do not randomly become takeover targets). The 
self-selection and sample selection inverse Mill’s ratios we use in our tests are respectively based on 
the first stage regressions we report as model (3) of Table A1 and model (4) in Table A2. In 
employing Heckman’s model, it is important to correctly specify the first stage regressions.  Hence, 
our first stage tests are constructed following Agrawal and Knoeber (1998), Palepu (1986), Comment 
and Schwert (1995), and Bates, Becher and Lemmon (2008). The results in these first stage 
regressions conform to the evidence in prior work. For example, in Table A1 the coefficient for 
target size is consistent with the findings in Agrawal and Knoeber (1998). In Table A2, the estimates 
                                                     
21 Following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on “component” data using the aggregate value of 
cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate 
premia based on “initial price” and “final price” data based on the initial offer and final offer price, respectively. 
These prices are also reported by SDC. All three premium measures are deflated by the target’s market value 42 
trading days prior to the bid announcement. The “combined” premium is based on the “component” measure if it is 
greater than 0 and less than 2; otherwise the premium relies on the “initial price” measure (or on the “final price” 
measure if initial price data are missing). 
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for target size, poison pill, and classified board are in line with those in Palepu (1986), Comment and 
Schwert (1995), and Bates, Becher and Lemmon (2008), respectively. 
 When we employ the Heckman methodology we find that none of the selection controls in Tables 
4, 5, and 9 attain statistical significance at conventional levels. Therefore, we interpret these findings 
to indicate that our analyses are immune to selection issues. Nonetheless, this interpretation assumes 
that our first stage Heckman (1979) regressions are properly specified. The correspondence of our 
first stage estimates to the extant literature suggests that this assumption is reasonable.22 
F. Bargaining Power 
We recognize that with a fixed amount of synergies, a lower premium will directly increase the 
bidder return. This possibility raises the issue of whether the bargaining power of the target is low or 
whether the target CEO gives away rents due to more important parachutes. Moreover, if the 
selection model fails to capture the relations between firm-specific bargaining power, the parachute 
terms, and being selected as a target, this issue is not mitigated with the two-stage approach we 
perform. As a result, it is imperative to account for the role of bargaining power because it directly 
impacts the inferences we can draw from our tests. 
We implement a number of empirical controls to alleviate the bargaining power-related concerns 
just described. First, the selection equation of the probability of becoming a takeover target (Table 
A2) controls for the Herfindahl index to capture a firm’s power in it its own industry. This choice is 
motivated by the argument in Rhodes-Kropf and Kadyrzhanova (2011) that characteristics (such as 
the level of industry concentration) that allow managers to delay takeovers have a significant 
bargaining effect. Second, when appropriate, our tests control for “target initiated deals,” a variable 
                                                     
22 We re-calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio from a regression that augments the parachute determinants model in 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1998). This alternative first stage regression is reported as model (1) in Table A1. We then 
use the alternate self-selection inverse Mill’s ratio in the tests in Tables 4 and 5. The findings are similar to those 
reported and the self-selection control remains statistically insignificant. We also produce two other sample selection 
inverse Mill’s ratios using regressions (1) and (2) in Table A2 as the first stage models. These regressions expand 
the specifications in Palepu (1986) and in Comment and Schwert (1995), respectively. We again use the alternative 
inverse Mill’s ratios in Tables 4 and 5: all results hold and the sample selection controls remain insignificant.  
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shown to affect the distribution of gains during mergers (Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2010), and, 
therefore, a reasonable proxy for a target’s bargaining power. We also control for input-output/sales-
purchases variables between the target and the bidder industries. Ahern (2012) argues that these 
customer-supplier relations proxy for the market power of the merger participants and help account 
for the role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers. Our results prove robust to 
controls for bargaining power. 
G. Tax Regulations and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
On February 19, 2002, the Internal Revenue Service proposed new regulations to Section 280G 
of the Internal Revenue Code.23 The new regulations provide amendments and clarifications to those 
issued on May 5, 1989, and apply to parachute payments occurring on or after January 1, 2004. The 
amendments clarify that the safe harbor related to change-in-control payments is three times the 
average taxable compensation over the five most recent calendar years prior to the change-in-control. 
It also states that a company that exceeds the safe harbor will lose tax deductions for the excess 
amounts and that the executive would be liable for a 20% excise tax on the excess payment. 
A 2008 study by RiskMetrics finds that the new tax regulations have done little to reduce 
parachute payments.24 In particular, the study reports that two-thirds of the companies in the S&P 
500 index disclose that they would provide excise tax gross-ups to their top executives. The excise 
tax gross-ups essentially free the executive from personally paying the excise tax on excess parachute 
payments. The RiskMetrics study shows that excise tax gross-ups are a costly benefit, since it 
generally takes at least $2.50 and as much as $4 to cover each $1 of excise tax that must be “grossed-
up.” In addition, other companies that do not provide the gross-up benefit may increase parachute 
payments in order to mitigate the excise tax to their executives. For our purposes, it is possible that 
                                                     
23 See: REG-209114-90 at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/20911490.pdf 
24 See: “Gilding Golden Parachutes: the Impact of Excise Tax Gross-Ups” by Kosmas Papadopoulos at 
http://www.riskmetrics.com/docs/2008ExciseTax 
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the new Section 280G rules may have affected the size of parachutes, and, in turn, the relative 
importance of these benefits. 
To investigate the potential effect of the new tax rules on parachutes, we revisit the regressions 
reported in Table 3 related to the relative importance of parachutes. In an untabulated test similar to 
that in model (1) of Table 3, we include a dummy variable for deals initiated after February 19, 2002. 
This variable also controls for the effect of other potentially important events that occur during 2002. 
For example, due to the new rules contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), many firms 
curbed the equity-based pay given to top managers while increasing their base salary (Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein, 2009). This pay redistribution could partially account for an increase in parachute 
importance. Nonetheless, the estimate for the 2002 indicator is not statistically significant. 
We also examine whether the shareholder wealth effects related to the importance of parachutes 
change following the passing of SOX. In unreported analyses, we estimate premium regressions 
similar to those in model (1) in Table 5. In these tests we add a control variable that interacts our 
parachute importance proxy with a dummy variable for merger deals occurring after the enactment of 
SOX. These tests reveal that after SOX a one standard deviation increase in parachute importance is 
associated with a statistically significant decline in deal value of about $148 million. While this 
marginal effect is higher than that of $127 million we estimate for the entire sample period, the pre- 
and post-SOX point estimates are not statistically different. We also add a similar interaction term to 
an acquirer return regression similar to those reported in Table 7. This additional test shows that after 
SOX increasing parachute importance by a single standard deviation raises the return to the acquirer 
by almost 1%.  In general, according to the robustness tests in this section, the reported parachute 
wealth effects related to both target and acquirer shareholders continue to obtain after SOX. 
H. Changes of Parachute Importance during Merger Negotiations 
The vast majority of parachutes we examine are in place in the CEOs’ compensation contract 
before their firms become takeover targets. We note that 116 out of 851 target CEOs in our sample 
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(about 14%) do not have a parachute prior to the start of merger negotiations. However, 23 of the 116 
firms that do not offer a parachute put one in place once merger talks begin. In addition, 30 of the 
735 firms that do have parachutes for their CEOs raise their value during merger negotiations. 
Removing these 53 observations from our sample does not alter our results. We also run premium 
regressions similar to those in Table 5 in which the key independent variable is a dummy that is “1” 
if targets either augment the size of an existing golden parachute or put one in place during 
negotiations (the 53 cases described above). Similar to Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), the 
estimates for this variable are negative but not statistically significant.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The debate surrounding golden parachutes -- particularly during acquisitions -- has recently 
intensified. Advocates argue that, during mergers, parachutes induce target CEOs to act in the best 
interest of their shareholders. Opponents claim that it is unfair to provide managers in the acquired 
firm with a financial safety net despite the fortunes of their shareholders. Regulatory actions have 
intensified this controversy: new securities laws mandate the disclosure of parachute compensation 
during mergers. We summarize this controversy with the following research question: when a firm 
becomes a takeover target, do parachutes align the incentives of the target managers receiving them 
and the shareholders in the targeted firms that grant them? We frame this question in the context of 
well-known hypotheses in corporate finance: incentive alignment and managerial interest. 
We test these hypotheses in a recent sample of 851 acquisitions bids during 1999-2007 using a 
novel measure of parachute importance that captures the moral hazard meeting the target CEO. Our 
measure scales the parachute payment by the expected pay loss this CEO incurs if the merger is 
completed. 
In our M&A sample, the unconditional probability of deal completion is 87.8% and the average 
premium offered is 35.9%. We find that a one standard deviation increase in parachute importance 
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raises this probability to 94.7% but lowers the premium to 33.3% These estimates imply that the 
expected premium is very similar (at 31.5%) with or without an increase in parachute importance. 
This result suggests that it is rational for target CEOs to accept a lower premium when they have a 
more important parachute because the expected value of their equity-based portfolio is unaltered.  
We also find a positive association between parachutes and the unconditional takeover premium 
indicating that their presence yields an unconditional net gain to shareholders. This result indicates 
that it is also rational for shareholders to give their CEO a parachute. 
The fact that raising the importance of parachutes does not alter the expected premium suggests 
that these provisions are not really harmful to the target shareholders. Our results indicate that with a 
more important parachute target CEOs negotiate a takeover price that reflects their own reservation 
premium. This premium leads to a certainty equivalent: CEOs accept a lower bid premium to both 
insure bid success and trigger the receipt of their merger pay package. We also examine the returns 
accruing to our sample bidders upon merger announcement. These tests reveal that bidder returns 
increase in parachute importance. This result documents a transfer of wealth from shareholders of the 
target to shareholders of the acquirer. At first glance, this finding appears consistent with the 
managerial interest hypothesis. Nonetheless, the fact that acquirers are able to execute a good deal 
when more important parachutes are provided to target CEOs does not undermine the conclusion that 
target shareholders also benefit from golden parachutes because they get a completed bid they would 
have not otherwise received. In sum, our results show that conditional on a merger, target 
shareholders are worse-off than they would have been in a deal without a parachute for the target 
CEO, but they are unconditionally better-off because with a parachute a merger is more likely to 
occur. 
From a public policy perspective, our paper informs the ongoing debate about the effectiveness 
of golden parachutes and provides timely evidence related to recently-passed securities laws 
regulating parachute provisions during acquisitions. 
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From an academic perspective, our paper has broad implications for the empirical literature 
studying whether (and how) the structure of managerial compensation affects firm value. In this 
context, our measure of parachute importance (which reflects the moral hazard issue target CEOs 
confront) provides a new, unique, and economically informative prism to examine the incentives of 
parachutes. Indeed, a distinct attribute of our measure of parachute importance is that it leads to a 
certainty equivalent that is proportional to the expected lost compensation for target CEOs. In 
addition, our empirical evidence conforms to the theoretical prediction in Ross (2004). He argues that 
attitudes towards risk depend not only on the convexity of an agent’s overall pay schedule, but also 
on how the schedule maps into more (or less) risk averse areas of the agent’s utility function to the 
extent that the mapping can remove the effect of convex (or concave) compensation schedules. Our 
findings suggest that a relatively more important parachute alters how (and where) the target CEO’s 
entire pay schedule maps into his utility function thereby making the executive more risk averse. 
Under this possibility, our results offer a solution to the paradox in the literature showing that target 
CEOs negotiate lower takeover offers when they get personal benefits even though it is improbable 
that the value of those benefits always makes these CEOs whole from their acquisition-related 
personal losses. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
 
This table describes our sample which consists of 851 mergers and acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 and 
tracked in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) merger and acquisition database in which the target is a publicly 
traded U.S. company and the deal value is at least $1 million. For selecting the sample, we require that target firms 
have stock return, accounting, and governance data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), Compustat, and RiskMetrics (formerly the Investor Responsibility Research Center) database, respectively. 
In Panel A, deal status, mode of acquisition, method of payment, and deal attitude are obtained from SDC. As in 
Officer (2003), we classify a deal as a hostile takeover if the bid is recorded by SDC as ‘‘hostile’’ or ‘‘unsolicited’’. 
Information on sale procedure and initiator is obtained from reading the merger background filed with the SEC. As 
in Boone and Mulherin (2007), auction refers to cases in which the selling firm contacts multiple potential buyers 
while negotiation focuses on a single buyer. Initiator is the party that first contacts the other party in the sale process. 
A deal is in the same industry if both the target and the acquirer belong to the same Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry classification. In Panel B, all financial variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year before the merger 
announcement date. Market-to-book is market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Leverage equals the 
book value of debt divided by market value of assets. Deal value is obtained from SDC. In Panel C, ownership is the 
percentage of stock and options owned by the CEO. Market value of ownership is measured as of 20 trading days 
before the announcement date. In Panel D, compensation data are as of the end of the fiscal year before the 
announcement date. Estimated lost compensation is the estimated present value of the CEO’s lost compensation 
when his/her firm is sold as in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011). We obtain information on the golden parachute payment 
from the last proxy filed by the targets prior to the merger announcement, the S-4 proxy filed by the acquirers, 
and/or the DEFM14A proxy filed by the targets following the merger announcement. 
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Panel A. Deal Characteristics    
 Mean Median  
Completion (0,1) 0.878   
Tender offer (0,1) 0.182   
Stock payment (0,1) 0.162   
Cash payment (0,1) 0.549   
Hostile takeover (0,1) 0.069   
Auction (0,1) 0.337   
Target initiated (0,1) 0.393   
Same industry (0,1) 0.561   
Deal value ($ billion) 4.758 1.544  
 
Panel B. Target Characteristics    
 Mean Median  
Market value ($ billion) 3.302 0.991  
Market-to-book 1.734 1.422  
Leverage 0.260 0.248  
 
Panel C. Target CEO Characteristics  
 Mean Median  
Chairman (0,1) 0.570   
Founder (0,1) 0.128   
Compensation committee member (0,1) 0.013   
Age (years) 54.390 55.000  
Tenure (years) 7.165 4.786  
Ownership (%) 4.632 1.836  
Market value of ownership ($ million)    96.079 22.728  
 
Panel D. Target CEO Compensation and Golden Parachute Characteristics 
  Mean First quartile Median Third quartile 
Salary and bonus ($ million)    1.662 0.636   0.940   1.525 
Total compensation ($ million)    5.366 1.170   2.615   5.022 
Parachute (0,1)    0.864    
Parachute multiple    2.225 2.000   2.999   3.000 
Parachute value ($ million)    4.873 1.482   2.553   4.573 
Lost compensation ($ million)  39.896 7.501 16.387 36.524 
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TABLE 2 
Parachute Importance 
 
The sample consists of 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1. In Panel A we provide 
the temporal distribution of our sample. In Panel B, we report the industrial classification of the deals we study using 
the Fama French (1997) 12-industry classification. Both panels in this table provide information about our proxy for 
parachute importance. We measure the importance of the parachute for the target CEO as Parachute / Lost 
Compensation.  
 
 
Panel A. Temporal Distribution    
   Parachute / Lost Compensation 
Year N % Mean Median 
1999 160 18.80 0.283 0.122 
2000 132 15.51 0.255 0.119 
2001 69 8.11 0.214 0.145 
2002 29 3.41 0.310 0.113 
2003 46 5.41 0.254 0.124 
2004 77 9.05 0.201 0.112 
2005 97 11.40 0.226 0.117 
2006 121 14.22 0.226 0.135 
2007 120 14.10 0.291 0.125 
 
Panel B. Industrial Classification    
   Parachute / Lost Compensation 
Industry N % Mean Median 
Nondurable consumer goods 44 5.17 0.262 0.104 
Durable consumer goods 23 2.70 0.201 0.160 
Manufacturing 94 11.05 0.311 0.158 
Energy 43 5.05 0.279 0.146 
Chemical 18 2.12 0.556 0.137 
Business equipment 171 20.09 0.171 0.071 
Telecommunication 34 4.00 0.327 0.119 
Utilities 49 5.76 0.294 0.213 
Shops 85 9.99 0.235 0.151 
Health 76 8.93 0.166 0.112 
Finance 112 13.16 0.359 0.156 
Other 102 11.99 0.189 0.120 
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TABLE 3 
Determinants of Parachute Importance 
 
The sample consists of 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1. The dependent variable 
in both Tobit models is (Parachute/Lost Compensation). All financial variables are measured at the end of the fiscal 
year before the merger announcement date. Q is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity 
plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of assets. Free cash flow is operating income before 
depreciation minus interest expenses, income taxes, and capital expenditures, scaled by book value of total assets. 
Firm age is the number of years from incorporation until the merger announcement date. High R&D (0,1) equals one 
if the target’s industry is in the top quartile of all industries sorted annually by industry-median R&D scaled by 
assets (similar to the method used by Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). G index is constructed by adding 24 
antitakeover provisions tracked by RiskMetrics as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). As in Hartzell, Ofek, and 
Yermack (2004), a CEO is near retirement age when s/he is at least 62 years old at the time of the acquisition. 
Tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in the chief executive position until the merger announcement date. 
Insider ownership and institutional ownership are the percentage of common stock owned by each group, 
respectively. Percent of independent directors is the fraction of independent directors on board. All ownership 
variables are measured as a percentage of common equity. Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. 
We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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       Dependent Variable = Parachute / Lost Compensation 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept -5.489*** -5.382*** -5.382*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Target Characteristics     
Log (Assets) -0.023* -0.028** -0.036** 
 (0.066) (0.031) (0.017) 
Q -0.014 -0.013 -0.003 
 (0.351) (0.414) (0.831) 
Leverage 0.087 0.107 0.139* 
 (0.218) (0.143) (0.093) 
Free cash flow -0.084 -0.078 -0.022 
 (0.657) (0.677) (0.899) 
Log (Firm age) -0.023 -0.030 -0.005 
 (0.285) (0.174) (0.790) 
Prior year excess return -0.175 -0.193 -0.149 
 (0.380) (0.369) (0.530) 
High R&D (0,1) 0.244 0.189 0.097 
 (0.560) (0.650) (0.802) 
CEO Characteristics    
Founder (0,1) -0.168*** -0.153*** -0.143*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
Compensation committee member (0,1) 0.172 0.181 0.194 
 (0.177) (0.158) (0.101) 
Number of outside directorships -0.023 -0.025 -0.038 
 (0.463) (0.431) (0.193) 
Chairman (0,1) 0.000 -0.013 -0.009 
 (0.991) (0.687) (0.756) 
Log (Age) 1.491*** 1.455***  
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Near retirement age (0,1)   0.653*** 
   (0.001) 
Tenure 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ownership 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.385) (0.947) (0.389) 
Option value / Total compensation -0.279*** -0.281*** -0.269*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Governance Characteristics    
G index (minus parachute)  0.011* 0.010* 
  (0.090) (0.092) 
Pct of independent directors  0.061 0.093 
  (0.506) (0.273) 
Insider ownership (excluding CEO)  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.214) (0.198) 
Institutional ownership  0.001 0.002 
  (0.210) (0.168) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 851 851 851 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.264 0.283 
Pr>χ2 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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TABLE 4 
Parachute Importance and Deal Completion 
 
The sample consists of 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1. The dependent variable 
in the logit models equals one if the proposed merger is ultimately consummated. The key independent variable in 
both models is (Parachute/Lost compensation). Target termination fee (0,1) equals one if the target has a termination 
fee provision in the merger contract. Cash payment (0,1) equals one if the deal is paid entirely in cash. Regulated 
industry (0,1) equals one if the target’s industry belongs to railroads, trucking, airlines, telecommunications, or gas 
and electric utilities. Target input/Acquirer output is the industry-level percentage of dollars of target industry input 
for each acquirer industry output dollar. Target purchases/Acquirer sales is the percentage of all acquirer industry 
sales purchased by the target industry. As in Ahern (2012), we calculate these two measures of customer-supplier 
relationship between the target and the acquirer using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output 
‘Use’ and ‘Make’ tables. The Parachute Heckman lambda and the Target Heckman lambda involve a first-stage 
estimation of the probability of having a golden parachute and the probability of becoming a target as in Model (3) 
and Model (4) of Tables A1 and A2, respectively. In the second stage, the inverse Mill's ratio from the first stage 
model is included in the estimation as a variable to control for endogenous self-selection. Other variables are self-
explanatory or defined elsewhere. We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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  Dependent Variable = 1 if the Deal is Completed 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Intercept -1.194 -1.251 
 (0.632) (0.607) 
Parachute / Lost compensation 1.574** 1.571** 
 (0.028) (0.030) 
Target termination fee (0,1) 1.442*** 1.456*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Target lockup (0,1) -0.517 -0.552 
 (0.645) (0.621) 
Prior bidding (0,1) -2.502*** -2.524*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash payment (0,1) 0.162 0.169 
 (0.704) (0.691) 
Tender offer (0,1) 1.345*** 1.352*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) 
Hostile deal (0,1) -3.010*** -2.991*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Regulated industry (0,1) -0.383 -0.406 
 (0.699) (0.680) 
Same industry (0,1) 1.060*** 1.046*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Target initiated (0,1) 0.146 0.156 
 (0.666) (0.645) 
Target input / Total acquirer output -0.458 -0.449 
 (0.931) (0.933) 
Target purchases / Total acquirer sales 0.090 0.065 
 (0.984) (0.988) 
CEO near retirement (0,1) -0.393 -0.342 
 (0.465) (0.522) 
CEO-chairman (0,1) 0.170 0.146 
 (0.631) (0.676) 
CEO equity ownership  -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.506) (0.517) 
Log (Target’s Assets)  -0.262** -0.256** 
 (0.032) (0.039) 
Parachute Heckman lambda -0.146  
 (0.576)  
Target Heckman lambda  -0.088 
  (0.731) 
Year and industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
N  851 851 
Adjusted R2  0.451 0.451 
Pr>χ2  0.001 0.001 
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TABLE 5 
Golden Parachutes and Acquisition Premia  
 
The sample consists of 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1. The dependent variable in the ordinary least squares (OLS) models is 
the acquisition premium as reported by SDC, which is calculated as the offer price divided by the target’s stock price four weeks before the merger 
announcement date. Model (1) uses the parachute importance relative to the expected lost compensation to the target CEO as the main independent variable. 
Model (2) uses the parachute (0,1) as the key independent variable. The independent variable of interest in model (3) is the natural log of the parachute payment 
to the target CEO. The main independent variable in model (4) is the parachute multiple. Prior year excess return is the cumulative abnormal return during the 
one year window ending 20 trading days prior to the merger public announcement, calculated from the market model using the CRSP value-weighted return as 
the benchmark with an estimation period of one year prior to the beginning of the above window. Overconfident CEO (0,1) is defined as Malmendier and Tate’s 
(2005) long-holder measure and follows Hall and Liebman’s (1998) option classification procedure. It equals one if the target firm’s CEO owns options at the 
beginning of the last year of the options’ life that are at least 40% in the money. Target CEO post-deal employment (0,1) equals one if the target CEO already 
holds or obtains either a directorship or an executive appointment such as CEO of the acquirer or a subsidiary, chief financial officer, chief operating officer, 
chairman, vice-chairman, president, or vice-president in the bidder firm after deal completion. In case of withdrawn deals, it equals one if the target CEO already 
holds any of the positions just described or if the merger proxy states that the target CEO will be employed by the bidder upon deal completion. Rumor (0,1) 
equals one if the deal is rumored as reported in SDC. Litigation (0,1) equals one if the deal has associated litigation reported in SDC. Time to completion 
measures the number of days to close the transaction from the time it is announced. One year change in IP index is the difference in the industrial production 
index over one year period before the merger. Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. 
We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (3) Model (4) 
  (A) (B) (A) (B)  (A) (B) (A) (B) 
Intercept 0.305 0.292 0.519
***
 0.531
***
 0.495
***
 0.508
***
 0.483
**
 0.494
***
 
 (0.324) (0.345) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Golden Parachute Measures         
GP / Lost compensation -0.058
**
 -0.060
**
       
 (0.023) (0.017)       
Parachute (0,1)   -0.063
**
 -0.062
**
     
   (0.032) (0.026)     
log (Parachute value)     -0.007* -0.007**   
     (0.050) (0.040)   
Parachute multiple       -0.018
*
 -0.018
**
 
       (0.052) (0.045) 
Target Characteristics         
Log (Assets) -0.020
**
 -0.016
**
 -0.016
*
 -0.013 -0.014
*
 -0.011 -0.013
*
 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.048) (0.051) (0.116) (0.090) (0.183) (0.095) (0.185) 
Q -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.283) (0.219) (0.327) (0.282) (0.316) (0.271) (0.280) (0.240) 
Leverage 0.095
**
 0.096
**
 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069 
 (0.049) (0.047) (0.184) (0.185) (0.177) (0.178) (0.167) (0.166) 
Free cash flow  -0.080 -0.075 -0.097 -0.094 -0.087 -0.084 -0.089 -0.086 
 (0.512) (0.538) (0.451) (0.463) (0.498) (0.511) (0.489) (0.502) 
Liquidity 0.169
***
 0.174
***
 0.116
*
 0.120
*
 0.112
*
 0.117
*
 0.114
*
 0.118
*
 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.061) (0.052) (0.070) (0.060) (0.065) (0.056) 
Prior year excess return 0.088
***
 0.088
***
 0.099
***
 0.098
***
 0.098
***
 0.098
***
 0.098
***
 0.097
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Target CEO & Board Characteristics         
CEO near retirement (0,1) -0.013 -0.010 -0.047
*
 -0.047
*
 -0.047
*
 -0.046
*
 -0.047
*
 -0.046
*
 
 (0.675) (0.760) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.086) (0.081) (0.087) 
Overconfident CEO (0,1) -0.015 -0.016 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.456) (0.451) (0.716) (0.731) (0.730) (0.744) (0.707) (0.717) 
CEO-chairman (0,1) -0.025 -0.026 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.209) (0.194) (0.307) (0.310) (0.315) (0.318) (0.286) (0.284) 
CEO-founder (0,1) 0.033 0.036 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.021 
 (0.275) (0.242) (0.538) (0.526) (0.524) (0.511) (0.515) (0.498) 
CEO’s tenure  0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.299) (0.285) (0.359) (0.351) (0.326) (0.319) (0.283) (0.278) 
CEO’s equity ownership  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.476) (0.432) (0.585) (0.552) (0.594) (0.559) (0.611) (0.577) 
CEO post-deal employment (0,1) 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.018 
 (0.314) (0.397) (0.289) (0.326) (0.287) (0.325) (0.303) (0.343) 
G index (minus parachute) -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
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 (0.528) (0.606) (0.562) (0.615) (0.556) (0.611) (0.575) (0.626) 
Board ownership  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.407) (0.392) (0.160) (0.164) (0.157) (0.161) (0.169) (0.170) 
Pct of independent directors 0.017 0.005 0.026 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.021 
 (0.772) (0.924) (0.649) (0.689) (0.639) (0.680) (0.675) (0.723) 
Deal Characteristics         
Private acquirer (0,1) -0.048 -0.049
*
 -0.062
**
 -0.062
**
 -0.061
**
 -0.062
**
 -0.061
**
 -0.061
**
 
 (0.107) (0.100) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.045) (0.043) 
Cash payment (0,1) 0.073
***
 0.071
***
 0.066
***
 0.065
***
 0.066
***
 0.065
***
 0.065
***
 0.065
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.090
***
 0.089
***
 0.104
***
 0.103
***
 0.104
***
 0.103
***
 0.103
***
 0.102
***
 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hostile (0,1) 0.064
*
 0.066
*
 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054 
 (0.092) (0.085) (0.171) (0.163) (0.164) (0.157) (0.165) (0.158) 
Same industry (0,1) -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.867) (0.720) (0.951) (0.978) (0.951) (0.977) (0.979) (0.950) 
Rumor (0,1) 0.087
**
 0.083
**
 0.085
**
 0.084
**
 0.085
**
 0.084
**
 0.084
**
 0.082
**
 
 (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.033) 
Litigation (0,1) -0.096 -0.092 -0.105 -0.103 -0.105 -0.103 -0.100 -0.098 
 (0.312) (0.333) (0.270) (0.277) (0.270) (0.277) (0.294) (0.304) 
Prior bidding (0,1) 0.075
***
 0.074
**
 0.062
**
 0.062
**
 0.064
**
 0.064
**
 0.063
**
 0.063
**
 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
Toehold (0,1) -0.002 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.008 
 (0.962) (0.927) (0.941) (0.861) (0.933) (0.851) (0.938) (0.861) 
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.045
*
 0.047
*
 0.045
*
 0.047
*
 0.045
*
 0.046
*
 0.044
*
 0.046
*
 
 (0.072) (0.058) (0.070) (0.062) (0.073) (0.064) (0.076) (0.067) 
Time to completion 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.405) (0.388) (0.443) (0.430) (0.452) (0.438) (0.467) (0.454) 
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.054
***
 -0.055
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.053
***
 -0.054
***
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Target input / Total acquirer output 0.174 0.174 0.110 0.101 0.102 0.092 0.120 0.112 
 (0.505) (0.505) (0.668) (0.695) (0.692) (0.720) (0.638) (0.662) 
Target purchases / Total acquirer sales -0.298 -0.298 -0.223 -0.217 -0.217 -0.211 -0.230 -0.224 
 (0.195) (0.194) (0.321) (0.336) (0.335) (0.350) (0.307) (0.320) 
One year change in IP index -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.745) (0.756) (0.879) (0.904) (0.895) (0.920) (0.896) (0.918) 
Parachute Heckman lambda -0.014  -0.002  -0.003  -0.004  
 (0.341)  (0.884)  (0.865)  (0.805)  
Target Heckman lambda  -0.024  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015 
  (0.113)  (0.316)  (0.308)  (0.344) 
Adjusted R2  0.226 0.228 0.236 0.237  0.235 0.236 0.235 0.236 
p-value of F-test   0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
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TABLE 6 
Unconditional Premia and Predicted and Surprise Parachute Analyses 
 
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the relation of acquisition premia with golden 
parachutes, antitakeover provisions, financial data, and characteristics of the takeover as in Comment and Schwert 
(1995). The dependent variable is the acquisition premium as reported by SDC. In Model (1), the sample consists of 
pooled time-series cross-sectional data of 14,157 firm-years with data available from CRSP, Compustat, and 
RiskMetrics during 1999-2007. In this unconditional premium regression, the takeover premium is set to zero in 
non-takeover firm-years. In Models (2) and (3), the sample consists of 851 deals described in Table 1. All financial 
characteristics are averaged over three fiscal years. Predicted parachute is the fitted parachute and surprise parachute 
is the error term from Model (3) of Table A1. These two variables enter Models (2) and (3) in this table separately 
from the Parachute (0,1). Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. The p-values are White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity consistent and adjusted for clustering by firms. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
 coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.025 0.119 0.966*** 0.001 0.848*** 0.004 
Parachute (0,1) 0.006*** 0.001 -0.076** 0.012 -0.069** 0.012 
   Predicted parachute   -0.202 0.412 -0.163 0.405 
   Surprise parachute   -0.069** 0.031 -0.066** 0.030 
Poison pill (0,1) 0.003** 0.039 0.016 0.400 0.010 0.590 
Classified board (0,1) -0.005 0.895 -0.004 0.860 -0.017 0.374 
Supermajority to approve merger (0,1) -0.004 0.135 -0.026 0.467 -0.019 0.533 
Delaware incorporation (0,1) 0.002 0.333 -0.008 0.708 -0.010 0.607 
Log (Assets) -0.003*** 0.001 -0.015* 0.072 -0.013 0.101 
Q -0.002** 0.018 -0.018* 0.061 -0.016 0.104 
Leverage 0.007 0.194 0.094* 0.062 0.087* 0.074 
Liquidity 0.006 0.331 0.097 0.242 0.105* 0.089 
Free cash flow -0.006 0.203 -0.120 0.387 -0.109 0.392 
Prior year excess return 0.043 0.305 0.095*** 0.001 0.089*** 0.001 
CEO near retirement (0,1)     -0.041* 0.098 
Private acquirer (0,1)     -0.051* 0.089 
Cash payment (0,1)     0.063*** 0.006 
Tender offer (0,1)     0.107*** 0.001 
Hostile (0,1)     0.047 0.217 
Same industry (0,1)     0.000 0.995 
Prior bidding (0,1)     0.060** 0.031 
Target termination fee (0,1)     0.043* 0.084 
Target initiated deal (0,1)     -0.048** 0.011 
Target input / Total acquirer output     0.169 0.509 
Target purchases / Total acquirer sales     -0.258 0.249 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 14157   851   851  
Adjusted R2 0.028   0.179   0.235  
p-value of F-test  0.001   0.001   0.001  
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TABLE 7  
Parachute Importance and Acquirer Returns 
 
From the original 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1, we examine 459 offers made 
by U.S. public bidders in which data for these firms are available from CRSP, Compustat and RiskMetrics. We run 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of acquirer returns similar to those in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2005) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The dependent variable is the acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return 
over the three days around the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market model 
estimated during the (-272, -21) interval. The main independent variable is the parachute importance relative to the 
expected lost compensation to the target CEO. The competitive industry (0,1) equals one if the bidder’s industry is 
in the bottom quartile of all industries sorted annually by the Herfindahl index. An industry’s Herfindahl index is 
computed as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in the industry using data on sales (as in Masulis, Wang, 
and Xie, 2007). The unique industry (0,1) equals one if the bidder’s industry is in the top quartile of all industries 
sorted annually by industry-median product uniqueness. Product uniqueness is defined as selling expenses scaled by 
sales (as in Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). As in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002), liquidity index is the 
liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firm’s industry. This variable is defined as the value of all 
corporate control transactions for US$1 million or more reported by SDC for each year and industry divided by the 
total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same industry and year. Other variables are self-explanatory 
or defined elsewhere. The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. The symbols *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 Model (1)  Model (2) 
 coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.142 0.137 0.209** 0.046 
Parachute importance 0.015* 0.056 0.017** 0.031 
Deal Characteristics     
Relative size -0.038*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 
Stock payment (0,1) -0.026*** 0.005 -0.028*** 0.003 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.013 0.266 0.011 0.342 
Friendly deal (0,1) 0.032** 0.023 0.033** 0.021 
Prior bidding (0,1) 0.003 0.776 0.002 0.868 
Toehold (0,1) 0.040 0.157 0.035 0.229 
Same industry (0,1) 0.002 0.819 0.005 0.571 
Target initiated (0,1) 0.008 0.314 0.005 0.472 
Target input / Total acquirer output -0.237 0.241 -0.201 0.330 
Target purchases / Total acquirer sales 0.003 0.985 0.052 0.720 
Market Characteristics     
Competitive industry (0,1) 0.015* 0.072 0.014* 0.083 
Unique industry (0,1) -0.034*** 0.001 -0.038*** 0.001 
Liquidity index -0.012 0.583 -0.032 0.202 
One year macroeconomic change -0.009** 0.029 -0.008* 0.055 
Bidder Characteristics     
Log (Assets) -0.001** 0.013 -0.001** 0.012 
Q 0.002** 0.025 0.002** 0.031 
Leverage -0.019 0.467 -0.014 0.581 
Free cash flow 0.019 0.585 0.025 0.475 
Prior year stock returns 0.008 0.224 0.006 0.357 
G index -0.003** 0.049 -0.003* 0.062 
Board size -0.004 0.767 -0.001 0.992 
Delaware firm (0,1) -0.004 0.590 -0.001 0.420 
Target Characteristics     
Q   0.000 0.963 
Leverage   -0.023 0.520 
Free cash flow   0.087 0.501 
Prior year stock returns    -0.001 0.978 
G index   -0.003* 0.075 
Board size   -0.031* 0.066 
Delaware firm (0,1)   -0.001 0.928 
CEO near retirement (0,1)   -0.011 0.370 
CEO-chairman (0,1)   -0.005 0.537 
CEO ownership   0.000* 0.069 
Independent board (0,1)   0.006 0.631 
Board ownership   0.000 0.312 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 459   459  
Adjusted R2 0.215   0.216  
p-value of F test 0.001   0.001  
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TABLE 8 
Simultaneous Equations Analyses 
 
This table reports simultaneous equations regressions in which we treat golden parachute and acquisition premium 
as endogenous variables. We analyze 851 acquisitions announced during 1999-2007 described in Table 1. We report 
simultaneous equations results using the relative importance of parachute to the lost compensation (GP/LC) in Panel 
A and those using the parachute dummy, the parachute value, and the parachute multiple in Panel B. The 
instruments in the second stage regressions equal the fitted value from the first stage regression. We use probit 
regressions when the dependent variable is the parachute dummy and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
otherwise. Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent p-values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Simultaneous Equations Using the Relative Importance of Parachute to Lost Compensation (GP/LC) 
 Model (1A)  Model (1B) 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
Dependent Variable = GP / LC Premium  Premium GP / LC  
Intercept 0.224*** 0.464*** 0.370*** 0.294*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
GP / LC (instrument)  -0.419**   
  (0.037)   
Premium (instrument)    -0.019 
    (0.538) 
Log (Assets) -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.026*** 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Q 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.002 
 (0.980) (0.346) (0.277) (0.910) 
Leverage 0.050 0.154** 0.133** 0.075 
 (0.577) (0.027) (0.026) (0.406) 
Free cash flow 0.064 -0.063 -0.089 0.047 
 (0.688) (0.606) (0.400) (0.767) 
Liquidity -0.040 0.056 0.073 -0.027 
 (0.570) (0.313) (0.128) (0.711) 
Prior year excess return -0.143 0.702*** 0.762***  
 (0.538) (0.001) (0.001)  
CEO near retirement (0,1) 0.674*** -0.242 -0.041* 0.667*** 
 (0.001) (0.142) (0.095) (0.001) 
CEO-chairman (0,1) -0.009 -0.001 0.002 -0.009 
 (0.737) (0.949) (0.891) (0.750) 
CEO-founder (0,1) -0.132***  0.055 -0.122*** 
 (0.001)  (0.344) (0.003) 
CEO tenure  0.010*** 0.003 -0.001 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.181) (0.486) (0.001) 
Overconfident CEO (0,1) -0.050 -0.041* -0.020 -0.054 
 (0.176) (0.093) (0.295) (0.156) 
CEO equity ownership 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.481) (0.857) (0.813) (0.499) 
Pct. of independent director 0.104 -0.045 -0.088* 0.088 
 (0.151) (0.480) (0.070) (0.229) 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.139  0.288 0.129 
Regression’s p-value 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
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Panel B. Simultaneous Equations Using Alternative Parachute Proxies 
  GP proxy = GP (0,1)  GP proxy = log (GP value)  GP proxy = GP multiple 
  Model (2A) Model (2B)  Model (3A) Model (3B)  Model (4A) Model (4B) 
  2nd stage 2nd stage  2nd stage 2nd stage  2nd stage 2nd stage 
Dependent Variable =  Premium GP proxy   Premium GP proxy   Premium GP proxy  
Intercept 0.389*** 0.380 0.538*** 3.381*** 0.460*** 0.721*** 
 (0.001) (0.372) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) 
GP proxy (instrument) -0.116**  -0.054*  -0.136*  
 (0.044)  (0.075)  (0.071)  
Premium (instrument)  -0.584  -0.757  -0.165 
  (0.143)  (0.258)  (0.532) 
Log (Assets) -0.013** 0.025 -0.001* 0.281*** 0.001* 0.124*** 
 (0.048) (0.560) (0.063) (0.001) (0.062) (0.001) 
Q 0.004 -0.050 0.004 -0.103 0.001 -0.067* 
 (0.704) (0.432) (0.701) (0.321) (0.946) (0.099) 
Leverage 0.121** -0.029 0.141** 0.246 0.197*** 0.487* 
 (0.044) (0.944) (0.038) (0.713) (0.010) (0.065) 
Free cash flow -0.209* -1.090 -0.110 -0.445 -0.163 -0.557 
 (0.087) (0.180) (0.362) (0.704) (0.193) (0.229) 
Liquidity 0.055 -0.114 0.024 -0.841 0.023 -0.352* 
 (0.262) (0.724) (0.691) (0.115) (0.702) (0.095) 
Prior year excess return 0.710***  0.730***  0.744***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
CEO near retirement (0,1) -0.079*** -0.351 -0.063** -0.438 -0.058** -0.136 
 (0.008) (0.227) (0.032) (0.307) (0.038) (0.207) 
CEO-chairman (0,1) 0.040 0.328*** 0.037 0.640*** 0.026 0.175** 
 (0.115) (0.009) (0.179) (0.001) (0.266) (0.027) 
CEO-founder (0,1)  -0.446***  -0.981***  -0.397*** 
  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CEO tenure  -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 -0.011 0.000 0.004 
 (0.205) (0.215) (0.375) (0.488) (0.777) (0.524) 
Overconfident CEO (0,1) -0.021 -0.026 -0.016 0.048 -0.020 -0.007 
 (0.255) (0.843) (0.445) (0.819) (0.336) (0.936) 
CEO equity ownership -0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.465) (0.393) (0.576) (0.466) (0.600) (0.528) 
Pct of independent director 0.090 1.486*** 0.063 2.732*** 0.053 1.019*** 
 (0.396) (0.001) (0.552) (0.001) (0.597) (0.001) 
Adjusted R2  0.188 0.105  0.136 0.130  0.129 0.127 
Regression’s p-value   0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
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TABLE 9 
Analyses of Golden Parachutes Relative to the Merger Pay Package 
 
This table reports robustness tests of the importance of golden parachutes relative to the merger pay package on 
acquisition premium. Panel A shows the premium regressions and Panel B shows the simultaneous equations results. 
The key independent variable is the importance of the parachute relative to the merger pay package (GP/MPP). 
Other variables are self-explanatory or defined elsewhere. We report White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent p-
values in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Premium Regressions Using the Relative Importance of Parachute to the Merger Pay Package 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
 coefficient p-value  coefficient p-value 
Intercept 0.642*** 0.001  0.656*** 0.001 
GP / MPP -0.444*** 0.001  -0.442*** 0.001 
Target Characteristics 
    
Log (Assets) -0.036*** 0.001  -0.033*** 0.001 
Q -0.011 0.274  -0.012 0.233 
Leverage 0.055 0.247  0.053 0.258 
Free cash flow  -0.036 0.769  -0.034 0.782 
Liquidity 0.080 0.176  0.085 0.150 
Prior year excess return 0.117*** 0.001  0.116*** 0.001 
Target CEO & Board Characteristics 
    
CEO near retirement (0,1) -0.048* 0.058  -0.048* 0.060 
Overconfident CEO (0,1) -0.016 0.419  -0.015 0.442 
CEO-chairman (0,1) -0.022 0.248  -0.022 0.264 
CEO-founder (0,1) -0.000 0.988  -0.001 0.985 
CEO’s tenure  -0.001 0.535  -0.001 0.554 
CEO’s equity ownership  0.001 0.228  0.001 0.226 
CEO post-deal employment (0,1) 0.017 0.364  0.015 0.396 
G index (minus parachute) 0.000 0.957  0.000 0.901 
Board ownership  0.001 0.221  0.001 0.237 
Pct of independent directors 0.052 0.345  0.051 0.351 
Deal Characteristics 
    
Private acquirer (0,1) -0.062** 0.033  -0.063** 0.030 
Cash payment (0,1) 0.044** 0.050  0.043* 0.052 
Tender offer (0,1) 0.098*** 0.001  0.097*** 0.001 
Hostile (0,1) 0.035 0.331  0.036 0.319 
Same industry (0,1) 0.010 0.639  0.008 0.698 
Rumor (0,1) 0.087** 0.018  0.085** 0.020 
Litigation (0,1) -0.101 0.266  -0.101 0.266 
Prior bidding (0,1) 0.073*** 0.007  0.073*** 0.007 
Toehold (0,1) -0.024 0.560  -0.020 0.639 
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.036* 0.068  0.037* 0.062 
Time to completion 0.000 0.201  0.000 0.193 
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.039** 0.034  -0.039** 0.031 
Target input / Total acquirer output 0.134 0.584  0.122 0.617 
Target purchases / Total acquirer sales -0.174 0.417  -0.166 0.388 
One year change in IP index -0.001 0.916  -0.001 0.947 
Parachute Heckman lambda -0.003 0.819    
Target Heckman lambda 
   -0.017 0.263 
Adjusted R2 0.230   0.231  
p-value of F-test  0.001   0.001  
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Panel B. Simultaneous Equations Using the Relative Importance of Parachute to the Merger Pay Package 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
 1st stage 2nd stage  1st stage 2nd stage 
Dependent Variable = GP / MPP Premium  Premium GP / MPP  
Intercept 0.645*** 0.715*** 0.370*** 0.845*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GP / MPP (instrument)  -0.534**   
  (0.025)   
Premium (instrument)    -0.054 
    (0.219) 
Log (Assets) -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.017*** -0.058*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Q -0.017* 0.001 0.010 -0.011 
 (0.080) (0.902) (0.277) (0.186) 
Leverage 0.048 0.159*** 0.133** 0.120** 
 (0.437) (0.004) (0.026) (0.032) 
Free cash flow 0.075 -0.050 -0.089 0.026 
 (0.495) (0.608) (0.400) (0.790) 
Liquidity -0.129*** 0.004 0.073 -0.090** 
 (0.009) (0.947) (0.128) (0.044) 
Prior year excess return -0.213 0.541*** 0.762***  
 (0.401) (0.001) (0.001)  
CEO near retirement (0,1) 0.016 -0.032 -0.041* -0.007 
 (0.536) (0.150) (0.095) (0.775) 
CEO-chairman (0,1) 0.032* 0.020 0.002 0.033** 
 (0.086) (0.267) (0.891) (0.046) 
CEO-founder (0,1) -0.104***  0.055 -0.074*** 
 (0.001)  (0.344) (0.004) 
CEO tenure  -0.004*** -0.003* -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.080) (0.486) (0.001) 
Overconfident CEO (0,1) -0.020 -0.030* -0.020 -0.031* 
 (0.301) (0.081) (0.295) (0.077) 
CEO equity ownership -0.003*** -0.002 0.000 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.107) (0.813) (0.001) 
Pct. of independent director 0.194*** 0.015 0.088 0.146*** 
 (0.001) (0.820) (0.170) (0.001) 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.143  0.298 0.137 
Regression’s p-value 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
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Appendix. Heckman (1979) First Stage Regressions 
 
TABLE A1 
Probability of Having a Golden Parachute 
 
This table presents regressions of the first stage Heckman (1979) selectivity correction on the probability of having a 
golden parachute. Both regressions are logit models that use 14,157 firm-years with data available from CRSP, 
Compustat, and RiskMetrics during 1999-2007. Model (1) includes the takeover threat variable from Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1998), which is defined as the relative frequency of acquisitions in the two-digit SIC industry of a firm 
among all Compustat firms over the next three years. Model (2) includes poison pill and classified board variables 
among others as in Comment and Schwert (1995) and Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008). Model (3) controls for 
industry concentration with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index using sales. All firm financial characteristics are 
averaged over three fiscal years. The p-values in parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent and 
adjusted for clustering by firms. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Intercept 1.363*** 0.341 0.227 
 (0.001) (0.119) (0.388) 
Log (Assets) -0.028*** -0.021** -0.021** 
 (0.003) (0.033) (0.033) 
Q -0.085*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.416*** 0.392*** 0.393*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sale growth  0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.504) (0.708) (0.718) 
Liquidity -0.671*** -0.577*** -0.577*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Free cash flow 0.179** 0.181** 0.181** 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) 
Prior year excess return 0.651 0.414 0.413 
 (0.246) (0.477) (0.478) 
Takeover threat 0.222*   
 (0.072)   
Poison pill (0,1)  0.683*** 0.683*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Classified board (0,1)  0.215*** 0.216*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Supermajority to approve merger (0,1)  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.989) (0.974) 
Delaware incorporation (0,1)  -0.032 -0.032 
  (0.202) (0.203) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index   0.478 
   (0.434) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,157 14,157 14,157 
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.149 0.149 
p-value of F-test  0.001 0.001 0.001 
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TABLE A2 
Probability of Becoming a Takeover Target 
 
This table presents regressions of the first stage Heckman (1979) selectivity correction on the probability of 
becoming a takeover target. All models are logit regressions that use 14,157 firm-years with data available from 
CRSP, Compustat, and RiskMetrics during 1999-2007. Model (1) uses variables similar to those in Palepu (1986). 
Model (2) includes a poison pill indicator variable as in Comment and Schwert (1995). Model (3) augments the 
specification Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008). Model (4) controls for industry concentration with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index using sales at the industry level. All firm financial characteristics are averaged over three fiscal 
years. The p-values in parentheses are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent and adjusted for clustering by 
firms. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Intercept -2.246*** -2.279*** -2.463*** -2.518*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Assets) -0.099*** -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.103*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Q -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.177 0.158 0.120 0.121 
 (0.122) (0.136) (0.298) (0.296) 
Sale growth  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.952) (0.798) (0.942) (0.946) 
Liquidity 0.010 0.018 0.038 0.039 
 (0.942) (0.887) (0.776) (0.774) 
Free cash flow -0.216 -0.190 -0.220 -0.220 
 (0.282) (0.413) (0.277) (0.277) 
Prior year excess return 0.093 0.090 0.040 0.041 
 (0.919) (0.918) (0.965) (0.965) 
Poison pill (0,1)  0.100*** 0.073* 0.073* 
  (0.008) (0.071) (0.071) 
Control share law (0,1)  -0.133   
  (0.300)   
Business combination law (0,1)  -0.005   
  (0.942)   
Classified board (0,1)   -0.077** -0.076* 
   (0.050) (0.051) 
Golden parachute (0,1)   0.213*** 0.213*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Supermajority to approve merger (0,1)   -0.093 -0.093 
       (0.101) (0.102) 
Delaware incorporation (0,1)   0.111*** 0.111*** 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index     0.229 
    (0.813) 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,157 14,157 14,157 14,157 
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.072 0.077 0.077 
p-value of F-test  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
 
